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Abstract 
This article examines the global dynamics of late colonialism and how these informed 
South African apartheid. More specifically, it locates the programmes of mass 
relocation and bantustan ‘self-government’ that characterised apartheid after 1959 in 
relation to three key dimensions. Firstly, the article explores the global circulation of 
idioms of ‘development’ and trusteeship in the first half of the twentieth century and its 
significance in shaping segregationist policy; secondly, it situates bantustan ‘self-
government’ in relation to the history of decolonisation and the partitions and 
federations that emerged as late colonial solutions; and, thirdly, it locates the 
tightening of rural village planning in the bantustans after 1960 in relation to the 
elaboration of anti-colonial liberation struggles, repressive southern African settler 
politics and the Cold War. It argues that, far from developing policies that were at odds 
with the global ‘wind of change’, South African apartheid during the 1960s and 1970s 
reflected much that was characteristic about late colonial strategy. 
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This article analyses the South African apartheid project of repression and containment in 
relation to the end of empire. In response to the emergence of a mass anti-colonial movement 
during the 1950s, from the early 1960s the government intensified political repression 
significantly and embarked on a thoroughgoing project of social engineering to relocate black 
South Africans - particularly women, elderly, the unemployed and those deemed politically 
‘undesirable’ - to rural dumping grounds in the so-called ‘homelands’.
1
 This concerted effort 
to impress state power, impose labour controls and bring about racial segregation was 
justified in the rhetoric of ethnic national self-determination: ten ethnic ‘homelands’ or 
‘bantustans’ were to be led to a flimsy political independence. The mass relocation of black 
South Africans to rural relocation areas in the bantustans was a cornerstone of this policy. In 
the twenty year period from 1960 to 1980, more than 3.5 million South Africans were 
relocated, while at least a million people (likely many more) were moved to rudimentary 
townships in the bantustans.
2
 These relocations were widely condemned by activists and 
scholars, who described them as the ‘dumping grounds’ of apartheid.
3
 In spite of its concerted 
efforts, the South African government eventually failed to gain international acceptance for 
its bantustan scheme at the United Nations, where it was widely rejected as a farce.
4
  
 The bantustan scheme and apartheid population relocation have been understood by 
historians as a product of the racial and class project of the white supremacist state, designed 
to cement the migrant labour system underpinning white prosperity; to entrench the project of 
racial segregation and to undermine African nationalist mobilisation.
5
 While the continued 
assertion of settler colonial racism in South Africa after 1960 diverged clearly from the 
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emergence of African nationalist regimes to the north,
6
 the policies of relocation and partition 
that the South African government pursued from the early 1960s are much less peculiar to 
this context than the existing literature on apartheid might suggest.
7
 This article places these 
policies in their global milieu, while considering them in relation to the regional dynamics of 
southern African settler colonialism.
8
 
 It is not the intention of this paper to flatten local specificities in favour of an 
homogenising global narrative, but, rather, to trace the ‘global in the local’,
9
 connecting 
South Africa’s history of segregation and apartheid to the global histories of the end of 
empire and late colonial ‘repressive development’.
10
 A full explanation of the multiple global 
influences on South African apartheid demands thorough research in archives across the 
world including the United Nations (and League of Nations), other international organisations, 
and, of course, state archives in Pretoria, London, Washington and Lisbon. This article is the 
result of a more modest project. By bringing primary research and the South African 
historiography into conversation with an illuminating swathe of literature on late imperialism 
and the history of colonial development planning that has emerged over the last decade, this 
article locates the characteristic policies of ‘high apartheid’ - mass relocation and the ‘grand 
apartheid’ bantustan scheme - and their antecedents in a global frame. Inevitably, it leaves 
loose ends and raises new questions. 
 I argue that South African apartheid drew much more on global ideas about colonial 
development and imperial statecraft than has generally been recognised. It has been well 
documented that state policy and practice were shaped by competing domestic interests 
within the settler alliance - of ‘maize and gold’;
 11
 farming and industry
12
 - and by a 
blundering praxis that weighed Afrikaner nationalist ‘visionaries’ against ‘pragmatists’.
13
 
While these influences at the national level have been relatively well examined, the moulding 
of state policy and practice by global processes and imperial debates has been little explored. 
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The ‘high apartheid’ policies of ‘separate development’ and ethnic self-determination that 
characterised the administrations of H. F. Verwoerd (1958- 66) and B. J. Vorster (1966- 78) 
were not novel: they picked up a policy trajectory of indirect rule and trusteeship that had 




There is little evidence to suggest that the two supposed South African ‘traditions’ of 
segregation - liberalism and Afrikaner nationalism - developed as distinct ways of thinking or 
in isolation from one another. Apartheid was not a monolith, and historians should remain 
cautious of ideological determinism as an explanation for apartheid policy. We must be wary 
of historical explanations that place too heavy an emphasis on ideologies and their ‘origins’: 
ideologies are rarely coherent or unchanging; nor are they secluded from external (global) 
influences. The philosophical and theological traditions of the Dutch Reformed Church have 
underpinned dominant historical explanations for apartheid policy: Giliomee argues that the 
philosophy of apartheid was distinct from earlier segregationist ideas and policies.
15
 
Meanwhile, Dubow argues that ‘Christian National theory, volks nationalism, and cultural 
relativist ideas’ supported and justified the ‘ideology of apartheid’ that was pursued by 
Verwoerd, yet he rightly argues that historians should be careful not to assume that there was 
continuity between Afrikaner nationalist policy pronouncements of the 1940s and the 
promotion of ‘self-governing homelands’ in later decades.
16
 Historians have tended to 
emphasise the role of Verwoerd, the ideological coherence of his project and its centrality in 
shaping state praxis.
17
 Yet, as the work of Deborah Posel has shown, analyses of ideological 
justifications for state policy do not necessarily offer the most revealing window onto 
blundering state praxis: the two are not inextricably or even necessarily connected.
18
 
Governments do not do as they say they do, nor do states (in all their complex forms, 
institutions and guises) necessarily do what their governments say they do. As Dubow 
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tellingly states: ‘what was novel [about the apartheid idea] was its presentation as the 
distinctive product of Afrikaner thought.’
19
 The connected world of the mid-twentieth century 
presents a further challenge to the notion of a distinctly Afrikaner nationalist vision, as the 
changing politics of empire operated imprinted indelibly on the projects of state-making that 
they pursued. In the light of an analysis of the prevailing ideas concerning population, 
partition and trusteeship in the interwar years, and set in the context of the late colonial praxis 
of repressive state planning, South Africa’s bantustan project appears much less unique - and 
less distinctly emblematic of Afrikaner nationalism - than has been previously assumed. A 
global analysis suggests that apartheid ideologues - including Verwoerd and Eiselen - 
reproduced the central contradiction in ‘liberal’ thinking on colonial rule in the interwar 
years: trusteeship.  
 South African segregation, reserve policy, rural planning and villagisation initiatives 
were informed by global debates and policies of colonial development, population 
management and the post-war ‘high modernism’ of the ‘second colonial occupation’.
20
 These 
idioms, policies and practices were imbued with new impetus in the context of the Cold War 
and the collaborative efforts of the southern African settler states, with the support of the 
United States, to stamp out ‘communism’ and to preserve white supremacy.
21
 Work on the 
history of late colonialism and the dirty wars waged by imperial states at the end of empire 
reveals how counter-insurgency and villagisation strategies circulated within and among 
empires.
22
 In turn, these traditions shaped the repressive state planning that emerged in South 
Africa’s rural areas. 
It is now no longer possible to maintain - as a group of ‘liberal’ imperial historians 
used to - that British imperial paternalism and its apparent use of ‘minimum force’ was 
distinct from the racialist and ‘peculiar Afrikaner concoction’ of apartheid.
 23 
Extensive 
research on the murderous brutality of British late colonial strategy has overturned the 
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enduring myth of ‘minimum force’ with a new historical consensus that ‘coercion and 
counter-terror, not kindness and development’ were ‘the cornerstones of most British 
counter-insurgency campaigns.’
 24
 In the light of this historiography on colonial violence, 
little insight can be gained from upholding a distinction between English ‘liberal’ 
segregationism and Afrikaner nationalist policy. Imperial post-war villagisation strategies 
drew on a long and multi-linear genealogy of imperial policy: they may be traced in their 
earliest forms to imperial wars at the end of the nineteenth century in which the concentration 
camp emerged as a crucial means to ‘pacify’ anticolonial resistance.
25
 Just as the history of 
concentration camps in South Africa informed the emergence of new modes of imperial 
population containment, so late-imperial statecraft informed the character of apartheid 
practice. After 1945, somewhat paradoxically, modernising postcolonial states also took up 
the developmentalist baton from late colonial regimes, employing many of the same 
strategies to govern and control their populations and to bring about the unfulfilled promises 
of colonial development through authoritarian forms of resettlement planning.
26
 Apartheid 
mass relocation and the elaboration of the bantustan scheme must be understood against the 
backdrop of the growing influence of colonial counter-insurgency strategies upon rural 
‘development’ planning (and, indeed, vice-versa),
27
 while Verwoerd and Vorster re-imagined 






Peace, population and colonial development, c.1920-1945 
 
The policies adopted by the National Party after 1948 drew heavily on those laid down in the 
making of the South African settler state after the Act of Union (1910). Like many 
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‘revisionists’, Marian Lacey criticised the focus of ‘liberal’ historians on the racial doctrines 
of Afrikaner nationalists as an explanation for apartheid policy and instead located the ‘roots 
of apartheid’ (a common project among successive generations of historians) in an earlier 
context: the interwar administrations of Smuts and Hertzog. She argued that the 1936 Native 
Trust and Land Act, and the ‘Stallardist’ doctrine that was pursued under Hertzog (which 
rejected assimilation and African urbanisation in favour of segregation and indirect rule), 
formed the basis of the racialised system of ‘super-exploitation’ perfected under the National 
Party regime.
29
 The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act formed the keystone in the 
consolidation of state policy to address the co-called ‘native question’, while the expansion of 
the Department of Native Affairs (NAD) in this period underpinned the elaboration of this 
project of indirect rule and colonial trusteeship.
30
 The Native Urban Areas Act (1923) 
reflected the ideas of population ‘stabilisation’ that were present in imperial policy: drawn up 
by the NAD, it emphasised the role of the state in the protection of the welfare and residence 
rights of urban Africans. However, the Stallard Commission made recommendations to the 
contrary: that Africans should be no more than temporary urban workers, to ‘minister to the 
white man’s needs’.
31
 The passing of the 1936 Acts has often been understood as a victory 
for those in favour of the ‘Stallardist’ doctrine, but this interpretation should be revisited in 
the light of a more global perspective.
32
 
 If the ‘roots’ of apartheid’s bantustan system were to be found in the interwar years, 
these South African policies were also cultivated by the circulation of ideas among imperial 
elites and politicians. In the making of international peace after the First World War, 
population management and settlement, self-determination and colonial trusteeship were at 
the heart of the work of the League of Nations Mandates Commission and its imperial 
members, while, as one of the white settler dominions, South Africa occupied a central place 
in Britain’s vision of imperial trusteeship. These dynamics had a profound impression on the 
8 
 
formulation of South African policy, while, through Smuts, South African concerns were also 
imprinted onto the international regime.
33
 Alongside his central role in the making of the 
South African state, as ‘the promoter of the transmutation of the empire into commonwealth’, 
Smuts was the key proponent of the South African imperial project and highly influential in 
shaping global political concerns after the First World War.
34
 The 1936 Land Act mirrored 
the shift in British imperial thinking after the First World War away from assimilation and 
towards indirect rule and trusteeship.
35
 This legislation reflected dominant ideas about native 
administration among British colonial thinkers and their equivalents in the United States, 
where the so-called ‘Indian New Deal’ of 1934 emulated British policies of indirect rule and 
trusteeship.
36
 The Paris Peace Settlement of 1919 had enshrined colonial trusteeship in the 
parcelling out of territories to be governed under the ‘mandate’ of the League of Nations. 
South Africa’s de facto government of South West Africa under this provision was thus also 
influential in connecting global (or, rather, imperial) principles to the concerns of domestic 
governance, and in testing the limits of imperial ‘liberalism’.
37
  
 Smuts regularly cited Lugard’s ‘dual mandate’, advocating ‘parallel institutions’ and 
indirect rule for the ‘native’ population in South Africa.
38
 Similarly, Hertzog emphasised the 
importance of ‘moral responsibility’ in defending the 1936 provisions for further land 
transfers to Africans against the criticisms of Malan and his ‘purified’ National Party. In so 
doing, he echoed the ideas of development and trusteeship that dominated imperial discourse 
and appealed to Smuts and his contemporaries, while also refusing to commit funding for the 
purchase of land for Africans.
39
 The passing of the 1936 Land Act was therefore inconsistent 
and contradictory: while the Act echoed the idioms of ‘development’ and trusteeship 
espoused by Lugard and enshrined in the League of Nations mandates system, Hertzog also 
failed to commit the state to any significant investment in the reserves.
40
 This contradiction 
mirrored the ambivalence of British colonial welfarism in this period, which was weightier in 
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rhetoric than it was in substance, being geared as it was towards repositioning the imperial 
project amid the growth of anti-colonial nationalisms after the First World War.
41
 This 
paradox of hollow paternalism set a precedent for the policy of ‘independent homelands’ 
adopted by the National Party in later decades.  
 The question of global stability - or, more accurately, the stability of the imperial 
order - was foremost in the minds of imperial administrators and reformers in the 1930s.
42
 
The management of population displacements and refugee resettlement after the First World 
War came to be dominated by concerns to prevent further conflicts. By the end of the Second 
World War, ‘the idea of minority rights had vanished as if it had never existed’, Mazower 
argues: ethnic homogeneity became ‘a desirable feature of national self-determination and 
international stability.’
43
 According to this thinking, exemplified in the 1937 ‘Peaceful 
Change’ meetings held in Paris by the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 
population pressures and ‘surplus’ refugee populations threatened social and political stability. 
The imperative of protecting minorities was overwhelmed by the belief in geopolitical 
solutions: by the middle of the century, the dominant view among global politicians was that 
conflicts could be prevented only through controlled migration, population transfers and 
political, territorial partitions.
44
 The emergent acceptance in the interwar period of ethnic 
‘unmixing’ and population transfer as a pragmatic policy for the protection of imperial 




 British colonial administrators in the late-1930s were alarmed by the growth of 
proletarianisation, urbanisation and ‘surplus populations’ in various parts of the empire and 
the political challenge that this represented. The expansion of colonial development in Africa 
(marked by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940) was thus aimed at 
ameliorating the social effects of industrialisation and rural-urban migration, to safeguard the 
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profitability of colonial economies and the future of the imperial project. Through the 
provision of funding for welfare in their colonies, French and British imperial regimes 
weighed the ‘delicate balance of exploitation and development.’
46
 Informed by the structural 
functionalism of Malinowski’s anthropology, colonial development planners demonstrated a 
strong ‘agarian bias’.
47
 They aimed to restore the stability of rural African societies, seen to 
be threatened by ‘detribalisation’ and the apparent social disorder created by rural-urban 
migration, while improving the productivity of African agriculture and its capacity to 
‘absorb’, or ‘carry’, growing rural populations. African agriculture had been widely 
undermined and, it was supposed, urbanisation was precipitated not by the growth of colonial 
capitalism but by population pressures and environmental degradation in rural areas.
48
 
Thoroughgoing resettlement initiatives to ‘rationalise’ rural populations were thus to become 
central to rural development schemes in a variety of colonial contexts during the following 
decades.  
 Administrators, economists and politicians in America and across the British empire 
circulated in a global network of ideas, which encompassed the Soviet imperial state. In the 
late-nineteenth century, Russian imperial administrators and officials looked to European 
empires for models and methods of governance, contributing to a ‘family resemblance’ of 
imperial practice.
49
 Later, American intellectuals and radicals demonstrated a similar 
admiration for Russian policies, not least because of the way in which the Soviet state 
embodied an ostensibly post-imperial, ‘modernising multinational state’.
50
  The Bolsheviks’ 
nationalities policy was an ‘affirmative action empire’, designed to disarm nationalism by 
granting controlled forms of nationhood.
51
 During the interwar years, thousands visited the 
Soviet Union to see for themselves the ‘model’ policies of economic modernisation pursued 
there. They praised the Soviets’ dogged commitment to industrialisation and some explained 
the human suffering that resulted as the necessary costs of modernisation.
52
 Soviet planning, 
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not least the example of the special settlements, thus came to inform British and American 
paradigms of development and models of industrialisation both before and after the Second 
World War.
53
 Seen in the light of the circulation of ideas and practices within global empires, 
the apparent resemblance between British imperial methods (employed in Kenya and 
elsewhere) and the Soviet gulag makes better sense.
54
 
 South Africa’s own policy trajectory reflected the shifting patterns of international 
debate, policy and practice in the passing of the 1936 Land Act, its provision for the 
expansion of the reserves (however academic this became) and the emergence of early 
‘betterment’ planning. Meanwhile, South Africa’s racist settler politics further eroded the 
welfarist element of ‘trusteeship’ as these policies were translated in the local context. During 
the interwar period, as agricultural production in the reserves collapsed and with mounting 
white concern in the face of rapid African urbanisation, ‘South Africa’s “agrarian question” 
[came to be] at once a “native question”’, Tischler argues.
55
 While domestic policy 
undoubtedly shaped the implementation of rural planning, as it was adopted and refracted in 
the prism of South African settler politics, the policies associated with South African 
segregation nevertheless closely echoed the concerns and ideologies of imperial 
administrators, their ‘agrarian bias’ and emphasis on trusteeship.
56
 During the interwar years, 
the South African regime was no less interested than other imperial governments in 
reconfiguring and recasting its colonial project amid the growing challenges to white rule. 
Indeed, as Mazower’s work on Smuts demonstrates, South Africa was an important node in 









High apartheid South African policy - typified by political repression, mass relocation and the 
bantustan scheme - was thus no ‘peculiar Afrikaner concoction’.
58
 ‘Separate development’ 
was not invented in South African isolation by H. F. Verwoerd, who has been popularly 
understood as the primary ‘architect of apartheid’.
59
 Nor was the scheme of independent 
‘homelands’ foreseen or fully imagined when he came to power: it was developed under his 
successor, B. J. Vorster, as Miller has shown.
60
 Far from being an exception, South African 
apartheid displayed many of the characteristics and adopted many of the common strategies 
of the ‘late colonial state’ identified by Darwin.
61
 As South Africa’s white supremacist 
regime clung to power in the face of local resistance and decolonisation, apartheid policy and 
practice was not immune to the pressures for change. The white regime’s internal policies 
reflected its continued efforts to reposition itself in a changing world; to reimagine and 
sustain the future of the white settler regime. ‘High apartheid’ policy and planning fed on 
imperial and global debates about population transfer, on the political and military strategies 
of the late colonial empires (as the Cold War set in), and on the networks of colonial 
development planning that were being remoulded with the emergence of the postcolonial 
world. The apartheid state employed all of the characteristic means of late colonial statecraft 
described by Darwin: (1) proactive modernisation; (2) the concession of power to ‘para-
political institutions’ and the formation of alliances in ‘native’ organisations; (3) the 
centralisation of governance; (4) the expansion of the military and security apparatus; and (5) 
the use of idioms of self-determination to justify holding onto power in the face of mounting 
political opposition.
62
 The following discussion locates South African bantustan policy and 
planning in relation to global dynamics at the end of empire and these characteristics of late-
colonial statecraft. 
 Strong continuities in imperial strategy and development planning spanned the years 
before and after the Second World War. Those who had deliberated and defined the 
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geopolitical solutions of the interwar years came to be influential figures in the ‘high 
modernist’ expansion of development planning in the ‘second colonial occupation’ after 
1945.
63
 ‘Population activists’ including Alexander Carr-Saunders, Julian Huxley and C. P. 
Blacker bridged the ‘overtly racist colonialism of the early twentieth century and the more 
seemly neutral development project of the postwar era’, Ittman argues.
64
 Meanwhile, ideas 
about population that emerged in the interwar years were crucial in informing development 
theory during the 1950s and 1960s.
65
 
 The South African trajectory of rural planning after the Second World War was in 
step with British imperial thinking around ‘development’ and reconstruction. In a 1945 
speech to the Ciskeian General Council regarding the Transkei territories in 1945, Secretary 
for Native Affairs, D. L. Smit, argued (as Tomlinson would the following decade) that even if 
the ‘Released Areas’ (the areas of land demarcated for addition to the reserves in 1936) were 
purchased for African occupation that the land would not be sufficient for Africans to become 
full time farmers. Therefore, he argued, either further land should be acquired, or 
industrialisation should be encouraged to ‘absorb’ the landless.
66
 These proposals reflected 
longstanding concern among racist administrators with the ‘problem’ of ‘squatters’ on white-
owned land and the clamour among white farmers who wanted to see black tenants removed 
from the land. So-called ‘squatters’, the term laden with the racism of settler land politics, 
were considered by the state to be part-time and thus ‘inefficient’ farmers and a destabilising 
force for rural society. Smit argued that settlement planning should distinguish between 
‘efficient’, ‘modern’ farmers and landless people, and proposed that three types of ‘native 
villages’ should be established in the reserves: peri-urban villages to house a commuter 
workforce of farm labourers in ‘white’ South Africa (a practice already well established); 
industrial villages to house landless workers in new rural industries in the reserves; and rural 





These so-called ‘native villages’ and ‘closer settlements’ formed the basis of the mass 
resettlement initiatives that characterised high apartheid planning in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Indeed, as Mager shows, the politics of land in the Ciskei and ‘Border’ region was at a 
critical juncture on the eve of the 1948 election, as farmers pressed the state to intervene 
more decisively to limit African access to land, evict African tenants and exercise control 
over African labour.
 68
 For Smit and the officials of the NAD, the question of the 
management of the Ciskei reserves was central to the future of racial segregation in the Cape 
and was no doubt a significant driver in the making of ‘native’ policy. Smit’s proposals also 
reflected late-colonial and early-postcolonial thinking around rural development and the new 
interest in rural industrialisation to absorb ‘surplus population’.
69
 
 In line with the preoccupation of the National Party government with African 
urbanisation, during the 1950s, under the leadership of Verwoerd, the NAD set out to 
transform and elaborate the system of urban governance for Africans. It extended the state’s 
control over African movement and labour through the extension of influx controls to 
women; through the regimented planning of segregated urban townships and by introducing a 
system of labour bureaux designed to facilitate and ‘rationalise’ the employment of African 
migrant labourers.
70
 The expansion of the NAD under Verwoerd in this decade comprised its 
transformation ‘into an authoritarian leviathan’, which exerted ever-growing control over the 
labour and everyday lives of Africans.
71
  This transformation served the interests of farmers 
who lamented the flight of rural labour to the cities; assisted industrialists who profited from 
cheap migrant alongside settled urban labour, and mollified obsessive segregationists (the so-
called ‘visionaries’ in the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs -SABRA) who called for 
thoroughgoing racial segregation.
72
 The expansion of this super-department also reflected the 
‘authoritarian high modernism’ of development planning in the ‘second colonial occupation’ 





expanded NAD became ‘a state within a state’ and developed the regime’s ‘perception of 
itself as the organizer of social life in every sphere of African affairs.’
74
  
Through the NAD, apartheid planning was a critical way of reimagining the future of 
white supremacy in South Africa. Plans and maps cemented the logic of apartheid and 
offered a set of discourses to underpin and legitimate segregation in the post-war language of 
self-determination and trusteeship, while simultaneously promising to impose order on an 
uncertain future and perceived social disorder.
75
 The 1950s were marked by a mammoth 
investigation into the question of social and economic planning in the African reserves. The 
Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas, led by Frederick 
Tomlinson (the Tomlinson Commission) produced its seven-volume report in late 1954. Its 
recommendations echoed those made by previous government commissions, most notably the 
Native Affairs Commission (1932) and the Fagan Commission (1946).
76
 The extent of 
African land dispossession in South Africa was so extensive, and the pressure of population 
on the reserves so intense, that, even if further land were purchased according to the 1936 
provisions, Tomlinson believed it was an impossible task to foster agricultural economies in 
the reserves that would be capable of supporting their dense populations. In the light of this, 
and in addition to agricultural and settlement interventions, he favoured the growth of 
industrial capacity and employment in the reserves. Tomlinson’s recommendations echoed 
many of the central tenets of development thinking in the late colonial period (and the 
interventionist welfarism that characterised postwar states more generally), as colonial 
authorities experimented with more audacious schemes to reorganise land tenure and rural 
societies.
77
  Indeed, the report’s vision for rural social restructuring was vast. It 
recommended: the separation of full-time farmers from non-farmers and the removal of 
‘inefficient’ farmers from the land; the implementation of a land ‘rehabilitation’ programme 
and major resettlement interventions; the industrialisation of the reserves; and the promotion 
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of ‘tribalism’ (considered a ‘stabilising’ force in rural society) according to the provisions of 
the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.
78
 It is well known that Tomlinson’s recommendations for 
industrial development in the reserves were rejected by Verwoerd: instead, the government 
encouraged private investment in border industries on the fringes of the reserves. Yet, in an 
effort to bolster the political project of independent ‘homelands’, the policy would later be 
reversed to reflect Tomlinson’s initial proposal, indicating the enduring influence of the 





 Tomlinson’s scheme for industrial rural development drew on emerging global 
orthodoxy around rural ‘community’ development. In many aspects, his recommendations 
mirrored the scope of the Swynnerton Plan (1954) in Kenya. Both commissions were 
concerned that the state should intervene decisively and comprehensively to manage the 
proliferation of rural people considered to be unemployed or underemployed - so-called 
‘surplus’ populations - and to ‘absorb’ and utilise their labour in ‘modern’ agriculture and 
industry.
80
  Tomlinson’s recommendations reflected the growing interest in rural industrial 
development at the end of empire. Caribbean-born Arthur Lewis, who had earlier worked for 
the British Colonial Office and under Alexander Carr-Saunders at the London School of 
Economics, came to be one of the most prominent development economists of his generation. 
In 1979 he won the Nobel Prise for his influential 1954 article, ‘Economic Development with 
Unlimited Supplies of Labour’.
81
 Drawing on the context of the late colonial Caribbean, 
Lewis argued that development through industrialisation demanded the fuller exploitation of 
the labour of the rural unemployed. Known as the ‘Lewis model’ (the ‘Lewis labour surplus 
module’ or the ‘dual sector model’) this article came to be a key text in development 
economics and was transplanted to inform planning contexts across the ‘Third World’. The 
principles of ‘community development’ that were central to Lewis’ work dovetailed with the 
imperatives of racial segregation in South Africa. They informed the way that ‘separate 
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development’ was later conceived, as well as the spurious narration of apartheid as a project 
of ethnic self-determination and national flourishing. 
 In the wake of the Tomlinson Commission, attempts to modernise South African rural 
‘betterment’ planning through the policy of ‘Stabilisation, Reclamation and Rehabilitation’ 
(1954) echoed Smits’ proposals for thoroughgoing resettlement planning a decade earlier. 
The discursive and schematic practices of planning for the resettlement of refugees after the 
Second World War provide an important context for understanding the framing of this 
policy.
82
  Peter Gatrell has shown how the ‘institutional vocabulary’ of ‘rehabilitation’ 
emerged in the course of refugee resettlement in Europe after the First World War and how, 
after 1945, the doctrine of ‘rehabilitation’ became central to conceptions of state planning and 
post-war recovery. The UN Relief and Rehabilitation Act (UNRRA) envisaged the ‘total 
rehabilitation’ of the economy, agriculture, transport and industry and saw work as central to 
the restoration of individuals. These ideas were taken up by Nehru in India following the 
upheavals of the partition; in Palestine following the Nakba, and in a variety of other 
contexts.
83
 The discourse of rehabilitation, Gatrell argues, ‘offered a road map for the 
restoration of a “property” or “capacity” that had been lost in the course of displacement’ and 
was central for the promotion of ‘self-government’.
84
 The global postwar rhetoric of 
displacement, resettlement, village-level rural development and self-government informed 
South African rural planning and its discourse of ‘rehabilitation’. The developmental kudos 
of the latter was employed to endorse South Africa’s cynical scheme of racial exploitation 
and exclusion. The planning of what the government called ‘self-contained Bantu towns’ in 
the bantustans was a convenient and cynical packaging of its programmes of forced 
relocation, which externalised poverty to the bantustans and disenfranchised the black 
population. More than this, however, the discourse drew on global ideas about ‘self-
development’ and self-determination that were influential in a range of global contexts. To 
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argue that such developmental discourse was just ideological ‘window dressing’ misses some 
of the substance of this rhetoric.  
 Verwoerd’s articulation of ‘apartheid’ employed a language that was strikingly 
reminiscent of Smuts’ ‘parallel development’. Smuts had envisaged a ‘Greater South Africa’: 
a regional powerhouse of white settler influence, which would come to encompass South 
West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the British-governed High Commission Territories 
(HCTs, comprising of Basotholand, Swaziland and Bechuanaland: modern-day Lesotho, 
Swaziland and Botswana).
85
 Smuts’ imperial imagination was deeply imprinted on the South 
African state inherited by the regimes presided over by Verwoerd and then Vorster. Even 
while the Tomlinson Commission realised early in its work that it was unlikely that Britain 
would cede the HCTs to South Africa,
86
 the geopolitical project that the Commission 
envisaged was nevertheless built upon a longstanding imperial vision for the region.
87
 While 
the creation of a ‘Greater South Africa’ was stymied by Britain’s refusal to hand over the 
HCTs, following the declaration of a Republic and South Africa’s departure from the 
Commonwealth in 1961,
88
 Verwoerd’s bantustan scheme took up the baton of Smuts’ project 
in many of its rhetorical and strategic aspects. Verwoerd explicitly linked his policy of 
‘separate development’ to Britain’s imperial project. As Ivan Evans has shown, the rapid 
crystallisation of Verwoerd’s thinking on the subject became apparent in a series of speeches 
in late 1958 and early 1959 in response to Britain’s announcement of imminent self-
government for the HCTs. In a speech in January 1959, Verwoerd compared self-governing 
bantustans in South Africa to Britain’s role in the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’. By the end of 
May, with potential opposition among chiefs in the Transkeian Bunga having been stifled, the 
Promotion of Bantu Self- Government Act was passed, setting out the intention for self-
government in eight ethnic national units.
89
 As the largest and most contiguous geographic 
entity among the reserves, with a long-established advisory African council, the Transkei was 
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to become the first experiment in bantustan self-government. Verwoerd responded to 
Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ speech in 1960 by declaring that his ‘homeland’ policy ‘was 
not in variance with the new direction in Africa, but is in the fullest accord with it.’ He 
regarded South African whites as the ‘link’ between the ‘white nations of the world and the 
nations of the new African states.’
90
 Verwoerd echoed Eiselen’s recently-published 
perspective on ‘multi-community development’, in which South Africa would play the role of 
‘mother country’ in a local reworking of trusteeship in the British Commonwealth.
91
 In 
January 1961, Verwoerd was further encouraged to develop the bantustan policy by the UN 
General Secretary, Dag Hammarskjöld, on his visit to South Africa to investigate human 
rights violations. The men met six times in as many days. While Hammarskjöld was critical 
of any attempt to deny black South Africans the rights of citizenship, he encouraged the 
government to develop the ‘homelands’ policy as a ‘competitive alternative’ to integration.
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Giliomee argues that Hammarskjöld’s untimely death later that year deprived the South 
African government of a critical international interlocutor for their project.
93
 
 The bantustans represented an ‘illusion of decentralisation’ by the South African 
government,
94
 as it forged alliances with indigenous elites while elaborating parapolitical 
‘native’ institutions and invoking ‘self-government’ to justify colonial rule.
95
 As British 
colonial rulers ‘looked over their shoulders at the new claimants to power waiting in the 
wings’, federalism came to emerge as a common imperial solution to demands for democratic 
political change.
96
 British politicians and administrators continued to justify colonial rule by 
invoking a transition to ‘responsible government’ or ‘self- government’, invoking the 
language of self-determination and promising local control over local affairs while never 
conceding to a change in the imperial administration and its control over foreign policy and 
defence. As Ivan Evans has argued, the South African Department of Native Affairs ‘remade 
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itself in the image of British decolonizers’ as it withdrew its authority from the Transkei 
reserve leaving in place ‘self-government’ under a system of ‘tribal’ authorities.
97
 
 Britain’s withdrawal from India was undoubtedly an important example in the 
development of imperial policy, not least South Africa. The British had never envisaged 
having to retreat so quickly and chaotically from colonial India. Stafford Cripps’ proposals 
for an Indian federation of princely states aimed to dilute the influence of the Indian 
Nationalist Congress by establishing alliances with local elites.
98
 Subsequently, the British 
government’s enduring racism shaped its adoption of the Fabian rhetoric of racial 
‘partnership’ as it redeployed the civilising mission in ‘guiding’ colonies to ‘self-
government’.
99
 Proposals for political federations during the late colonial period were shaped 
by the demands of colonised peoples, as well as by the paradoxical imperial ideas of 
trusteeship and ‘civilisation’.
 100
 During the 1950s, Britain experimented with and planned for 
federations in Central Africa, East Africa, the West Indies, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.
101
 
The Central African Federation (1953-64) emerged as an important experiment in what 
Collins has described as a post-war ‘federal moment’, which, he argues, represented a ‘new 
civilising mission’.
102
 This episode of Britain’s ‘developmental imperialism’ no doubt 
schooled South African administrators in the possibilities of reconfiguring settler 
dominance.
103
 Meanwhile, federalism occupied a significant place in debates on the left in 
Europe after 1945;
104




 Anti-colonial visions for change also identified the democratic potential of federalism. 
The Garveyite vision of a United States of Africa was taken up by Pan-Africanists and was 
the focal concept in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963. The 
remarkable mobilisation of black South African migrant workers by the Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC) under Robert Sobukwe in 1959-1960 forced the South African state to 
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temporarily lift the pass laws and led to thoroughgoing political repression across the country 
following the declaration of a State of Emergency.
106
 The PAC saw its struggle as intimately 
linked to the global politics of African liberation, envisaged a rapid timetable of political 
change and employed a millenarian Pan-Africanist rhetoric.
107
 While the evidence is 
incomplete, it has been suggested that the iKongo movement, which emerged simultaneously 
against Bantu Authorities in the Eastern Cape, also connected its endeavours with Pan-
Africanist struggles and Lumumba’s vision in the Congo.
108
 The armed struggle against white 
settlers in French Algeria was at its peak in 1960, and in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea 
Bissau, non-violent movements were giving way to armed struggles.
109
 Belgium’s 
unexpected withdrawal from the Congo, where it had still envisaged a distant timetable for 
independence, inspired anticolonial movements and marked the fragility of colonial rule - not 
least in South Africa, where the Congo crisis became common source of metaphor for 
African nationalists and white supremacists alike, as they sought to make sense of the politics 
and possibilities in South Africa.
110
 Set against this backdrop, it is not hard to see how the 
protests generated by the PAC’s campaign in South Africa’s cities in 1960 were perceived by 
the white minority as a significant threat to the status quo. The launch of uMkhonto we Sizwe 
(‘Spear of the Nation’, the armed wing of the African National Congress- ANC) the 
following year further underscored white fears of change. Apartheid politicians drew 
increasingly on the idioms and strategies of the ‘federal moment’, seeking to shore-up the 
global credibility and political legitimacy of the South African settler project by recasting the 
geopolitics of segregation in the form of an ethnic national federal solution. Verwoerd’s early 
scheme for self-government cruelly echoed the language of democratic federal projects while 
emulating imperial strategies to remould white rule. 
Throughout the 1960s, in a variety of outward-facing government publications by the 
Department of Information, South African spin doctors employed a longstanding discourse, 
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now being deployed by Verwoerd, of Smuts’ ‘parallel development’ and imperial trusteeship. 
Throughout the glossy pages of the South African Digest, apartheid publicists marketed South 
Africa as a leading light of ‘civilisation’ in the postcolonial world. South Africa would serve 
the post-imperial ‘West’, so this publication claimed, as an agent of ‘civilisation’ in Africa, 
by leading the ‘homelands’ to a ‘peaceful’, ‘orderly’ independence, in contrast to the ‘chaos’ 
of events in the Congo and Nigeria and ‘dictatorship’ in Ghana.
111
 In making this argument, 
the apartheid mouthpiece of the Department of Information was no doubt pointing to the 
judiciousness of South African policies of ‘retribalisation’ in the bantustans, designed to instil 
compliance and order through ‘tradition’, while ‘modern’ metropolitan elites had come to be 
at the forefront of (the supposedly dangerous) nationalist politics in South Africa and across 
the continent. As much as the bantustan project was designed to contain dissent and divert 
nationalist opposition, partition and ethnic separation were projected outwardly as an 
acceptable solution for ‘durable’ peace in South Africa. 
Upon South Africa’s reapplication to the Commonwealth after the Republic 
referendum, Verwoerd withdrew when it became clear that the application would be 
rejected.
112
 Verwoerd underestimated the effect of widespread opposition to apartheid among 
newly independent African and Asian nations, both in the Commonwealth and in the Non-
Aligned Movement at the United Nations. A rapid and panicked retreat from empire ensued 
after 1960, ‘as British and French governments came to realise that hanging onto power 
would be too painful and costly’.
113
 As Darwin argues, the project of self-government ‘was a 
runaway train that refused to stop at the stations [that Britain’s colonial administrators had] 
built or to pick up the passengers they meant it to carry’: colonial rulers could not contain 
escalating demands for equality.
114
 In this context, and with the withdrawal of British support 
for white settlers in Kenya and the Central African Federation, South Africa shifted its 
alliances towards Portugal. 
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South African politicians feared diplomatic isolation. As South Africa became subject 
to deepening criticism of its racial policies at the UN, the regime further adapted the 
semantics of segregation and trusteeship. In his role as Prime Minister, Vorster preached 
ethnic self-determination and independence, while upholding the belief in South Africa’s 
regional imperial role. During the mid-1960s, it was believed in South African foreign policy 
circles that the federal aims of ‘separate development’ might be further pursued through the 
incorporation of Southern Rhodesia into South Africa’s formal ambit.
115
 South Africa’s 
imperial expansionism was thus described in an ANC paper to the UN Special Committee in 
1968: 
The attainment of independence by Zambia, Malawi, Botswana and Lesotho has occurred 
side by side with the implementation of an expansionist policy by the Pretoria regime, which 
has for its aim the establishment of an empire ruled over by the white master-race, and 
consisting of a large number of small black bantustans extending over the whole of southern 




By the end of the 1960s, following rapid imperial retreat from many colonies and the 
proliferation of newly independent nation-states, federalism had failed as an intra-imperial 
solution.
117
 Britain’s independence for the HCTs at the end of the decade (Lesotho, 1966; 
Botswana, 1966; Swaziland, 1968) paved the way for the promotion of ‘homeland’ 
independence in South Africa with the passing of the Homeland Citizenship Act in 1970. 
Britain’s withdrawal from the HCTs and the independence of Lesotho gave misplaced hope 
to Vorster that independent ‘homelands’ might be accepted internationally. Transkei 
compared favourably for the South Africans with tiny Lesotho: neither had significant 
domestic economies, while both were profoundly reliant on migrant labour to the South 
African mines. Yet Vorster’s renewal of ‘homeland’ policy was not popular: it was rejected 
by those on the Afrikaner far right. Denouncing the ‘creeping liberalism’ they perceived, 
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Afrikaner nationalist ‘purists’ in the Herstigte Nasionale Party were clamorous opponents of 
both Verwoerdian ‘separate development’ and Vorster’s expanded scheme for independent 
‘homelands’.
118
 These schemes spoke more to distant audiences around the world than to the 
Afrikaner electorate or, of course, the African majority. 
 Jamie Miller’s work reveals how, in the face of looming isolation and the political 
pressure of black nations to the north, Vorster’s regime recast the apartheid imaginary to 
protect its racialised political economy of white privilege. Vorster’s premiership was 
characterised by novel efforts to promote ‘homeland self-government’ as a durable solution 
in a changing world. He took the rhetoric of ‘separate development’ spearheaded by 
Verwoerd and reformulated it in the language of self-determination and racial equality: the 
‘homelands’ would be guided to independence and supported in their national development 
by Afrikaners- the ‘white Africans’. His outward policy pursued diplomatic relationships 
with anti-communist African states, while using these relationships to sell the idea of 
independent ‘homelands’ to white South Africans as a durable vision for change in the 
postcolonial world.
119
  Vorster’s attempt to recast apartheid in the idioms of the post-war 
world (i.e. self-determination, ethnic nationalism and ‘homeland self-government’) was more 
than mere ‘window dressing’. Following the Portuguese coup in 1974, which left South 
Africa exposed (dependent as it had become on this alliance), Vorster made a concerted effort 
to reposition South Africa diplomatically, to pursue relations with anti-communist African 
states, while cultivating support for this new language of legitimation among white interest 
groups. For a time, at least within the circles of ‘verlichte’ Afrikaner politicians, it seemed 
possible that Vorster might succeed in repackaging the apartheid project in a form that was 
more palatable on the international stage.
120
 Under an expanded profile and headed by 
apartheid spin doctors and evangelists, Connie Mulder and Eschel Rhoodie, the Department 
of Information modernised the existing rhetoric of South Africa’s civilising mission by 
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promoting the developmental merits of the ‘homelands’ policy; marketing ‘Bantu self-
government’ in glossy brochures selling ‘African tradition’ in ‘modern Bantu states’. Their 
diplomacy became increasingly desperate, as an enlivened internal movement and the global 
anti-apartheid lobby exposed the realities of apartheid and the duplicity of this paternalist 
discourse. 
By 1978, following the massive repression of the 1976-7 Uprising; the revelations 
regarding South Africa’s involvement in Angola’s civil war; and the failure of the Kissinger 
initiatives, Vorster retreated from his modernising project, realigning himself with the 
Afrikaner hard-right. His hopes of South Africa achieving acceptance among postcolonial 
states faded rapidly.
121
 The collapse of South Africa’s alliance with Portugal, and its 
floundering failure to appease African nationalists with the ‘homelands’ scheme drove the 
radicalisation of state security (and the militarisation of the state) from the late 1970s in the 
form of Botha’s ‘Total Strategy’.
122
 The Muldergate information scandal of 1978 also 






Cold War in southern Africa: villagisation and counter-insurgency 
 
American development planning in early postcolonial India was influential in sharpening the 
focus of planning on the village, Nicole Sackley argues.
124
 The American architect Albert 
Mayer’s pilot project for rural reconstruction in Etawah, India, centred on the village as the 
site for the preservation of the disciplining forces of ‘tradition’ amid rapid social change.
125
 
While its foreign policies angered those in Washington, Nehru’s government was 
nevertheless regarded by the Truman administration as the vital conduit for stemming the rise 
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of communism in India and Asia. Village-level rural development, based on the Etawah 
model, promised to bring self-sufficiency and a non-radical ‘peaceful revolution’ to the 
Indian countryside.
126
 These ideas circulated across fields of reconstruction and development 
planning throughout Asia (and indeed Africa) during the 1950s.
127
 As the Cold War escalated, 
Mayer’s pilot project in Etawah came to embody a set of Indian and American aspirations for 
development: it became an American model for rural reform.
128
 The experiment at Etawah 
was stripped of its local emphases and employed explicitly by Truman as a method in 
winning ‘hearts and minds’ in Asia.
129
 Sackley’s account of Etawah reveals how global 
fixation with the village as the site of social transformation was given a new impetus in the 
context of the Cold War. By the end of the 1960s, coercion had replaced paternalist 
developmentalism: the ‘international enthusiasm’ for ‘peasant relocation and the construction 
of fortress villages’ (in, for example, Mozambique, Angola, India, Vietnam, Malaya, Algeria 
and Southern Rhodesia) revealed the widespread influence of coercive counterinsurgency 
doctrines in development thinking.
130
  
 If development planning in India became the site of the American search for 
hegemony in the postcolonial world, Central Asia was the Soviet equivalent. Modernisation, 
development planning and ‘self-government’ in Central Asia became an important nexus for 
Soviet engagement with the non-aligned states after Bandung, as Krushchev sought to 
differentiate Soviet self-government from British colonial policy. As Kalinovsky argues, 
Central Asia came to be at the heart of the Soviet project, demonstrating to Soviet citizens 
‘that they were beneficiaries of and participants in the Soviet drive for material achievement’, 
while confirming to the wider world ‘that whereas the “imperialist powers” offered only 
domination, the Soviet model offered development without domination and inequality.’
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 Amid mounting opposition South Africa continued to protect the interests of the white 
minority electorate. It did so by seeking acceptance in the international arena through the 
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rhetorical project of ethnic national independence; by pursuing diplomatic relations with 
independent African regimes; by entrenching the security state (under Vorster and later P. W. 
Botha); by advancing white settler alliances in southern Africa; and by gaining diplomatic 
protection from the U.S., becoming its proxy and protector of western ‘civilisation’ in 
southern Africa.
132
 During the 1960s, the apartheid government pursued strategies that were 
characteristic of the late colonial state, developed in relation to the experiences of British, 
French and Portuguese late colonialism. South African resettlement policy displayed the 
characteristic qualities of the late colonial ‘repressive developmentalism’ described by 
Bandeira Jerónimo in Portuguese Angola, as counter-insurgency strategies were overlaid onto 
colonial forms of rural planning.
133
 Relocation as a form of apartheid statecraft coupled the 
discourses of paternalist ‘modernisation’ and ‘development’ with the imperatives of control 
and repression. As Feichtinger has argued, resettlement villages served a ‘double function as 
disciplinary spaces and laboratories of social transformation.’
134
 
 South Africa’s deepening regional alliance with the Portuguese colonial regime in 
Angola and Mozambique impressed upon its policies of rural planning and relocation. From 
the mid-1960s, following the collapse of the Central African Federation in 1964, South 
Africa became increasingly reliant on political and military alliances with Portugal. South 
Africa supported Portuguese colonial military strategies as a settler bulwark against anti-
colonial movements in the southern African region, funding Portuguese counter-insurgency 
campaigns in its African territories, Mozambique and Angola, to prevent the cross-border 
activities of black liberation movements. Nascent forms of co-operation through the mid-to-
late 1960s were solidified in the secret alliance of Exercise ALCORA (1970-74), through 
which South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia collaborated in political and military 
operations against African nationalist mobilisation in the region.
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 Dependence on this 





United States, meanwhile, protected South Africa diplomatically at the UN and elsewhere, 
while relying on South Africa’s military campaigns as a proxy for its geopolitical strategy of 
anti-communism in the southern African region. While the US foreign affairs department did 
not believe that the bantustan scheme of ethnic self-determination was a viable alternative to 
majority rule, it remained ambivalent about this policy in open forums, defying the UN.
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All the while, South African politicians were ‘delusional’, believing their project to be simply 
misunderstood: if they could only sell the policy of ethnic self-government more effectively 
to America and the western world, South Africa would overcome its isolation and win the 
support of the West in favour of its solution to decolonisation.
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 If the rhetorical project of independent ‘homelands’ ultimately failed to win 
international acceptance for the apartheid regime, the praxis of repressive planning - equally 
shaped by external forces - had profound consequences.
139
 South Africa’s growing co-
operation with Portugal in Angola and its intervention in the Angolan conflict from 1966 
shaped the strikingly similar rural planning policies that emerged in each of these contexts.
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More broadly, the regional collaborations of the white settler regimes in southern Africa 
during the 1960s and 1970s help to explain the strategies of ‘repressive developmentalism’
141
 
that were pursued throughout the region in South Africa, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia; 
and South West Africa.
142
 Bandeira Jerónimo highlights the significance of the ‘Uíge model’ 
in Portuguese colonial policy after 1961. In response to the 1961 uprising in northern Angola, 
the repressive and violent counter-insurgency strategies adopted by the Portuguese involved 
mass resettlement into rural villages (aldeamentos/ reordenamento rural);
143
 the fostering of 
‘rural communities’; the establishment of ‘tribal’ administration (regedorias) and rural 
schools. These strategies, developed in the northern region around Uíge, became the ‘model’ 
for counter-insurgency operations that cohered during the late 1960s (1966-8) in Angola.
144
 





 Bandeira Jerónimo argues that colonatos and aldeamentos ‘characterized the 
social engineering imagination of the late colonial State’ in Portuguese Africa. These 
resettlement programmes were ‘the exemplary model of the core premises of late colonial 
development.’
146
 Portugal’s low cost, ‘low-intensity’ colonial warfare, with rural population 
relocation at its heart, was perceived by military strategists to have had considerable success 
in repressing the anti-colonial struggle.
147
  
It is no accident that in South Africa, a similar trajectory simultaneously emerged 
during the mid-late 1960s, with the centralisation of influx control measures under the 
Department of Bantu Administration of Development during the mid-late 1960s; the 
extension of mass resettlement programmes and Vorster’s further elaboration of the bantustan 
strategy. The southern African regimes were co-operating in their mutual project of rural 
repression. In 1968, an ‘International Meeting of Technicians for Community Development’ 
was hosted in Angola, comprising a tour of the territory by delegations from South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia to share expertise in rural planning, population relocation and ‘community 
development’. The visitors were little impressed: they had not been shown around the 
northern district of Uíge, where resettlement policy was considered to have been a resounding 
success in stemming resistance and re-establishing colonial control. Van Rensburg, at the 
centre of South African policy-making on influx control and bantustan relocation, mocked 
the Portuguese efforts at community co-operatives in the south of Angola.
148
 If the precise 
ideological preoccupations and colonial concerns of the southern African settler states 
differed to a degree, their primary objectives were shared: to control, contain and discipline 
African societies through forms of rural resettlement. While rural planning and ‘development’ 
had long been employed to extend the control of colonial states,
149
 militarised control and 
coercion came to eclipse colonial social science in the project of colonial ‘modernisation’. 
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It was not until the 1960s that the South African state turned its full attention to the 
question of rural administration. The tightening of urban influx controls (pass law 
restrictions) over the African population throughout the 1950s, and in even more draconian 
ways after 1960, revealed the discontinuous connections between rural and urban colonial 
governance. In the Cape during the mid-1950s, administrators had lamented the slow pace of 
the provision of ‘native villages’ in the rural Ciskei bantustan which would expedite the 
removal of Africans from the Cape metropolitan area.
150
  Through the expansion of the 
euphemistically-renamed Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD), the 
state centralised its control over urban influx controls and rural planning in the bantustans.
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The South African state thus displayed the centralising tendency of the late colonial ‘big 
state’, as described by Darwin.
152
  From the mid-1960s, the BAD planned a swathe of new 
‘native villages’ and ‘bantu towns’ in the bantustans. In reality, the rudimentary provisions 
for these settlements were even more scarce than the planners had envisaged, with tragic 
consequences for those forcibly relocated to these areas. People were forced, in their 
thousands and often at gunpoint, to leave their homes and board a ‘GG’ (Government 
Garage) truck taking them to a resettlement site. They were accommodated in tents and 
temporary, prefabricated structures. Water and sanitation were scarce, food was short and 
many people - particularly children and the elderly - died of malnutrition, exposure and 
infectious diseases. The other consequence of establishing such sites for relocation 
throughout the mid-1960s, was to significantly speed up the removal of Africans from 
designated ‘white’ areas: the towns, cities and white-owned farmlands of the Republic. After 




‘Rapid resettlement’ into rural and peri-urban villages served multiple imperatives in 
apartheid South Africa:
154
 it facilitated the urban pass system and contributed to the 
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tightening of movement controls over African people; it enabled landowners to expedite the 
removal of labour tenants and farm dwellers living on white-owned farms, dispossessing 
them and in the process further commodifying farm labour;
155
 and it imprinted the authority 
of the white minority regime through repressive villagisation. The latter, while often 
acknowledged, has not been examined in a sustained way in the historical literature. From the 
mid-1960s, population removals were shaped as much by the imperatives of collective 
punishment and ‘pacification’ as they were by the priorities of racial segregation promoted by 




 The turn to armed struggle by the ANC and PAC and the rise of the migrant 
organisation Poqo (which aligned itself with the PAC) gave rise to a wave of ‘black peril’ 
discourse among South Africa’s white communities during the early 1960s.
157
 State 
initiatives of control and containment reflected this anxiety and, amid the growing influence 
of the Cold War, drew on well-established colonial strategies of colonial pacification.  In 
November 1962, two whites were murdered at a march in Paarl, outside Cape Town, by 
members of Poqo. The English and Afrikaans press depicted Poqo’s violent protests as 
evidence of African savagery and cried of the dangers of urbanisation and ‘detribalisation’.
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The Paarl march was followed by a significant state crack down, involving the arrest and 
detention of thousands of activists and suspected Poqo members. The Snyman Commission 
of Inquiry was then appointed to investigate the November events at Paarl. Early in the 
investigation, Snyman argued that it was ‘“vitally important to know why a situation such as 
that existing at Paarl could exist so long without being cleared up,” so as to “prevent 
repetition of what happened in Paarl, to punish the culprits and to remove the element of 
violence.”‘
159
 As Van Laun has argued, ‘the march had invoked underlying white fears of a 





 Van Laun’s analysis of the Snyman Commission reveals how political 
repression and segregationist settler colonialism were conjoined in the forms of governance 
and statecraft pursued in South Africa after 1960. The Commission conflated Poqo - a social 
movement of migrants - with the PAC, and, as in the emergencies in Malaya, Kenya and 
Nyasaland, it formulated a narrative of an insurrectionary plot by Poqo as a pretext for a 
thoroughgoing purge.
161
 The Snyman Commission deployed the ‘colonial myth’ of African 
‘savagery’ to call for a more stringent segregationist colonial order and for the removal of 
Africans from the Western Cape.
162
   
Through the mid-1960s the security state embarked on a political purge of the Eastern 
Cape, the heartland of support for the ANC and PAC. While this repression centred on Port 
Elizabeth, where the ANC was deeply rooted, it radiated into the rural towns of the region. 
Sham political trials were held in rural police stations and courthouses across the Eastern 
Cape, with investigations and interrogations carried out by Special Branch police. The 
charges largely fell under the sweeping Suppression of Communism Act; they were related to 
involvement with the ANC and PAC and acquittals were rare. As the lawyer John Jackson 
recalled, ‘allegations of torture were plentiful… conviction followed conviction.’
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The Ciskei’s resettlement areas, and others like them established throughout the 
bantustans during the 1960s, became ‘nodes’ in apartheid’s late colonial carceral regime. A 
great number of political activists arrested in this purge were banished to relocation sites in 
the Ciskei: Sada, Dimbaza, Ilinge and Mdantsane.
164
 In a valley, surrounded by mountains 
and accessible only via a long dirt track, Ilinge became a key site of political banishment. By 
1969 at least forty ex-political prisoners had been confined to Ilinge under banning orders: 
they were members of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC), and many had been incarcerated on Robben Island. The number of political prisoners 
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banished to the township - and others like it in the Ciskei - continued to rise through the 
following decade. 
The families of known activists and their communities in the small towns and cities of 
the Eastern Cape were also targeted in this repression. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 
1964 provided a veneer of legality for the forcible removal of African men, women, and 
children to undeveloped sites in the rural reserves. Many of the people removed to the Ciskei 
from across the Cape during the mid-1960s came from towns in the region where the PAC 
had established underground cells, including Aliwal North, Burgersdorp, Cradock, East 
London, Molteno, Steynsburg, Middelburg, Graaff-Reinet, King William’s Town and 
Queenstown. The townships around Port Elizabeth and Cradock, where the ANC had well-
established underground networks, became subject to forced removals and relocations to the 
Ciskei. The families of arrested ANC and PAC members were targeted by members of the 
Special Branch police and closely monitored once in their place of exile. The sites that 
emerged in the Ciskei in the early 1960s, including Sada, Dimbaza and Ilinge, were some of 
the earliest of their kind in apartheid South Africa, as the Western Cape led the way in the 




By the late 1960s, the concerns of the late colonial ‘security state’ had come to 
assume greater importance in the blend of overlapping imperatives that drove Apartheid-era 
population planning.
166
 During the mid-1960s, South African military and government elites 
were engaged in the study of imperial counter-insurgency texts that traced the ‘successful’ 
strategies of anti-communist repression employed in Malaya, Kenya and elsewhere.
167
 Daniel 
argues that these counter-insurgency doctrines started to shape South African security 
strategy in explicit ways from 1966.
168
 While ‘the emerging predominance of the Cold War 
paradigm did not eclipse nor replace the long-held racist paradigm’ of apartheid,
169
 he argues, 
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security concerns were embraced by senior National Party politicians and the elite security 
establishment, particularly under the premiership of Vorster from September 1966.
170
 The 
growing influence of colonial counter-insurgency doctrine in South Africa from the mid-
1960s; the regional political and military cooperation of southern African settler colonial 
states; and the global securitisation of rural planning amidst the dynamics of the Cold War all 
inform an understanding of rapid population relocation to the bantustans in this period.  
 
 




If South Africa’s segregationist policy was shaped by the global circulation of governance 
strategies among imperial elites, state praxis was also a response to and limited by ‘everyday 
resistance’.
172
 From the 1930s to the 1980s, pass law contraventions, peri-urban ‘squatter’ 
movements and labour organisations all forced the state to find new methods to achieve its 
aims. The tightening of urban influx controls and the state’s resort to forced removals during 
the 1960s were a direct response to black South Africans’ tenacious pursuit of urban 
livelihoods and their unwillingness to be shoehorned into the state’s vision of colonial 
governance and domicile in the reserves. As Legassick argued in 1984, before the pass laws 
were lifted in 1986, the most critical impediment to the South African state in its 
implementation of a coercive labour regime was ‘the resistance of its victims… [through the] 
spontaneous determination to find every small escape route from the imposition of 
controls.’
173
 These everyday refusals to abandon urban livelihoods compelled the regime to 
regiment more stringent, centralised and coercive forms of influx control in order to realise 
its vision of colonial order. 
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Those who were relocated to the bantustans became subject to the violence and 
coercion of repressive apartheid planning. Nevertheless, they exercised agency amid the 
oppression of displacement and local authoritarianism, making strategic alliances to improve 
everyday circumstances while carving out lives in the most challenging circumstances.
174
 
Facing dislocation, widespread unemployment and destitution, some people sought new 
patrons in the local representatives of tribal authority and were able to benefit from the 
limited concessions of housing and access to education that the system provided. These 




 Village planning and resettlement-as-counter-insurgency did not always have the 
effects that government planners desired. While the authoritarianism and technicism of 
bantustan resettlement planning no doubt strengthened the hand of ruling bantustan elites, 
they also had unintended consequences.
176
 Following the massive state repression of the early 
1960s, the Ciskei’s resettlement areas became important locations for the development of 
rural underground political networks.  After having served custodial sentences on Robben 
Island and in other prisons across the Republic, political prisoners were sent under banning 
orders to live in resettlement areas in the Ciskei and other bantustans.
177
 Some activists were 
subject to house arrest and they were monitored closely by the South African Special Branch 
police and the Ciskei’s police force. Nevertheless, these activists ‘turn[ed] camps into 
classrooms’,
178
 engaged in underground activities, and sought to politicise a new generation 
of activists. While control measures prohibited public meetings, sports and social clubs 
became an opportunity to educate younger people in the aims, objectives and strategies of the 
ANC and PAC. Through their underground networks, these activists housed political exiles 





 After 1976, the proliferation of resistance to the bantustan regime in the densely 
populated resettlement areas of the Ciskei testifies to the failure of the state’s efforts to 
contain dissent. The state’s limited vision of paternalism and ‘development’ in the bantustans, 
and the paltry provision of welfare for the people who lived in them, gave the project a short 
shelf life. By the middle of the 1980s, the deep and inescapable contradictions of the 
‘homelands’ had led to widespread rejection of this phoney apartheid project and the corrupt 
local bureaucrats and politicians who benefited from the patronage of state funds.
180
 
 The local dynamics of resettlement on the ground also shaped the evolution of state 
policy at the centre.
181
 The starkest evidence of this is in the government’s about-turn on its 
policy of spatial segregation in the Western Cape. Black South Africans denied formal 
residence in the Western Cape and forced to reside in the Ciskei and Transkei were 
compelled to seek work elsewhere or languish in rural deprivation in the bantustans. While 
influx controls and migrant labour bureaux channelled men into migrant labour contracts in 
mining and industry, many people defied these controls and went to urban areas in search of 
work. In Cape Town, as elsewhere, state authorities set about removing the thousands of 
people living in shack settlements on the fringes of the city, while denying urban residence 
rights to those classified as ‘African’.
182
 Most famously, the Cape Town city authorities 
sought repeatedly to remove those who had settled at Crossroads, many of whom had built 
livelihoods across the urban-rural nexus between Cape Town and the rural bantustans of the 
Eastern Cape.
183
 The strident resistance of women at Crossroads contributed to a 
reassessment of Cape Town’s urban policy: the creation of the vast African township of 
Khayelitsha represented a shift in the segregationist geopolitical strategy for the Cape, where 
permanent African residence had been denied. This was due in no small part to the refusal of 
black South Africans to be denied access to the city or to be cowed by the violent and 









This article began with the premise that the policies of ‘grand apartheid’ need to be 
understood in relation to developments beyond South Africa’s borders. It has argued that the 
forms of population control and relocation pursued in South Africa after 1960 drew on 
imperial efforts to exert control and contain dissent during the end of empire. The bantustan 
project of ethnic self-government was more than mere window dressing: it was developed 
under the influence of prevailing global strategies of population transfer and partition and 
was projected internationally as, South African politicians believed, an acceptably ‘modern’ 
solution to their ‘problem’: holding onto white power and privilege in the face of mounting 
opposition. 
Rural resettlement and villagisation served multiple and overlapping imperatives for 
the South African settler colonial state. Villagisation underpinned and promised to extend the 
segregationist regime of land governance under apartheid by facilitating removals from 
‘white’ areas. It promoted the interests of ‘modernising’ farmers by ‘commoditising’ farm 
labour and facilitating ‘accumulation by dispossession’:
185
 the eviction of tenants and their 
relatives from farms removed the last remnants of the paternalist contract from farm labour 
relations.
186
 Village planning also promised to transform and discipline rural societies, in the 
dual project of ‘pacification’ and ‘development’ that characterised imperial counter-
insurgencies. 
Rural planning cemented the future of white supremacy in South Africa, amid 
growing challenges to colonialism, within and beyond South Africa. South African bantustan 
resettlement was not well planned or methodically orchestrated: it was piecemeal, yet the role 
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of planning was critical. The discourse of development and the praxis of planning lent 
legitimacy, vision and order to a ‘blundering’ apartheid project, as the National Party regime 
entrenched the settler colonial order amid imperial retreat.
187
 Planning offered a rhetoric of 
modernisation, given new impetus by the promise of development in the postcolonial world, 
and facilitated the continued re-imagination of the white settler project in the era of 
decolonisation. Discourses of ‘community development’ and ‘self-development’ offered 
ways of legitimating white supremacy and apartheid to the rest of the world through the 
promotion of ethnic nationalism. While the notion of ‘self-governing homelands’ took shape 
under Verwoerd and was given new impetus by Vorster in an effort to further modernise 
apartheid, South Africa’s bantustan scheme was nevertheless an imperial vision, which drew 
on Smuts’ interwar notion of ‘parallel development’ and rested heavily on the belief in South 
Africa’s imperial role in ‘civilising’ southern Africa. 
In particular, British and Portuguese imperial strategies of ‘development’ and 
resettlement were adopted and adapted by the apartheid state and were employed to pacify 
resistance as well as to extend and entrench the settler colonial project as it came under 
increased pressure. Along with its network of prisons; the multiple police stations where 
political activists were detained without trial under the ninety-day law; and the common 
practice of political banishment; bantustan resettlement sites became nodes in South Africa’s 
late colonial carceral regime. The bantustan policy of ‘separate development’ was indeed 
aimed at deflecting opposition to the white regime and ‘externalising’ conflict from ‘white’ 
South Africa to the rural bantustans,
188
 but the global politics of late colonialism and southern 
African settler alliances played critical roles in shaping the content and the form of South 
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